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This	is	a	working	paper	based	on	a	recent	seminar	presentation	that	we	gave	(2019).	All	findings	are	preliminary	and	are	being	
presented	here	for	feedback	from	the	scientific	community.	Further	analysis	is	underway.		Comments	are	welcome	to	
neiljohnson@gwu.edu	
	
We	present	preliminary	results	on	the	online	war	surrounding	distrust	of	expertise	in	medical	
science	–	specifically,	the	issue	of	vaccinations.	While	distrust	and	misinformation	in	politics	can	
damage	democratic	elections,	in	the	medical	context	it	may	also	endanger	lives	through	missed	
vaccinations	and	DIY	cancer	cures.	We	find	that	this	online	health	war	has	evolved	into	a	highly	
efficient	network	insurgency	with	direct	inter-crowd	links	across	countries,	continents	and	
cultures.	The	online	anti-vax	crowds	(referred	to	as	‘Red’)	now	appear	better	positioned	to	
groom	new	recruits	(‘Green’)	than	those	supporting	established	expertise	(‘Blue’).	We	also	
present	preliminary	results	from	a	mathematically-grounded,	crowd-based	analysis	of	the	war’s	
evolution,	which	offers	an	explanation	for	how	Red	seems	to	be	turning	the	tide	on	Blue.			Distrust	and	misinformation	pose	an	acute	global	threat	to	established	science	and	medicine,	as	well	as	political	processes	[1-10].	Death	threats	are	being	made	against	climate	scientists	[3],	and	doctors	and	mothers	who	vaccinate	[4].	In	addition	to	widespread	spreading	of	diseases	such	as	measles	and	HPV	through	vaccination	hesitancy	[5-8],	distrust	of	established	scientific	treatments	for	cancer	are	leading	patients	to	adopt	dangerous	substitute	measures	[9].	More	generally,	the	number	of	countries	with	disinformation	campaigns	is	reported	to	have	more	than	doubled	to	70	in	the	last	two	years,	with	Facebook	remaining	the	top	platform	for	those	campaigns	[10].	Given	the	difficulty	social	media	companies	such	as	Facebook	are	having	with	online	activity	related	to	hate	[11],	terrorism	[12]	and	child	sexual	abuse	[13,14],	it	is	no	wonder	that	they	are	also	struggling	to	understand	how	such	online	misinformation	develops	and	spreads	from	local	to	global	scales,	and	hence	how	to	go	about	dealing	with	it.	There	have	been	many	valuable	studies	of	distrust,	misinformation	and	disinformation	at	the	level	of	individuals’	behaviors	including	on	Twitter.	However,	DiResta	and	others	have	pointed	out	that	what	is	missing	is	a	big	picture	understanding	in	the	national	and	global	populations	involving	millions	of	people	[15]	while	Starbird	has	also	highlighted	the	need	to	understand	the	important	role	of	unwitting	crowds	[16,17].	Indeed,	the	impact	of	crowds	--	and	in	particular	undecideds	--	is	known	to	play	a	central	role	in	the	dynamics	of	other	societal	systems	such	as	financial	markets	[17]	and	elections	[1,2,18].	
This	short	note	provides	some	preliminary	findings	from	our	system-level	analysis	of	the	current	health	war	over	vaccinations	in	the	universe	of	~3	billion	social	media	users	worldwide,	focusing	on	these	online	crowds.	There	are	of	course	caveats	to	our	study	and	analysis,	which	we	discuss	later	in	this	document.	However,	while	these	may	affect	the	details	of	what	we	show,	we	see	no	reason	why	they	should	qualitatively	distort	our	main	findings	and	hence	we	believe	that	our	main	conclusions	are	robust.	We	will	be	carrying	out	further	tests	and	collecting	more	data	in	the	near	future.	When	eventually	in	final	form,	the	figures	presented	here	will	look	different,	not	least	since	the	data	will	be	updated,	but	we	expect	that	the	main	takeaways	will	remain	similar.		Figure	1	shows	the	largest	component	in	the	network	of	>10	million	people	who	–	as	of	Oct	1,	2019	–	have	decided	to	partition	themselves	into	clusters	(e.g.	Facebook	Pages)	that	are	either	distrustful	of	
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established	medical	science	surrounding	vaccinations	(‘Red’,	anti-vaccination),	or	in	support	it	(‘Blue’,	pro-vaccination),	or	as	yet	undecided	but	nonetheless	engaged	(‘Green’,	neutral).	A	Green	cluster	is	considered	to	be	engaged	in	some	way	if	this	cluster	is	connected	to	another	Red	or	Blue	cluster	in	the	network	by	a	direct	link	at	the	cluster	level	--	not	simply	that	they	have	a	few	followers	in	common	with	each	other.	This	method	of	focusing	on	direct	links	between	clusters	at	the	cluster	level,	is	the	same	as	in	our	previously	published	studies	of	online	pro-ISIS	support	[12]	and	online	hate	[11].	Our	focus	on	clusters	–	and	in	particular,	the	mesoscale	cluster	dynamics	of	Red,	Blue	and	Green	--	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	clustered	correlations	are	known	to	provide	the	key	to	understanding	the	dynamics	of	many-body	physical,	chemical	and	biological	systems	and	the	likely	extension	to	social	systems.	Our	focus	on	clusters	also	conveniently	bypasses	the	current	data	impasse	facing	researchers,	and	facing	Facebook	itself,	over	concerns	for	individual	privacy.			
	
Figure	1.	Health	war	raging	online	globally	surrounding	vaccines.	This	is	the	largest	component	of	the	
network.	It	is	drawn	from	tracking	the	online	clusters	(e.g.	Facebook	pages)	that	are	anti-vaccination	
(Red),	pro-vaccination	(Blue)	and	neutral	(Green).	Inset	shows	a	map	with	these	clusters	according	to	
their	declared	geographical	location	(see	Fig.	2	for	more	details).	These	results,	while	preliminary	due	to	
missing	data	about	other	Green	clusters	and	current	cross-checking	of	Red	and	Blue,	already	show	the	
tendency	for	the	Red	subpopulation	to	form	into	a	large	number	of	clusters	with	a	range	of	sizes,	that	are	
connected	together	in	a	seemingly	decentralized	way	–	akin	to	an	insurgency.	Red	clusters	are	more	
closely	engaged	with	Green	clusters	than	Blue	clusters	are.	The	Blue	clusters	tends	to	be	off	to	one	side	of	
the	online	war,	with	large	formal	organizations	such	as	the	Gates	Foundation	(large	blue	circle,	bottom	
right)	seemingly	set	back	from	this	battlefield.	Cluster	network	drawn	using	ForceAtlas2	algorithm.	A	full	
version	of	the	network	(i.e.	with	a	full	search	for	connected	Greens)	is	given	in	Fig.	4,	and	shows	similar	
features,	with	the	trivial	presentation	change	that	the	side-arm	of	Blue	then	appears	on	the	right.		
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	There	are	several	features	of	Fig.	1	that	make	this	online	health	war	bear	more	than	a	passing	analogy	to	an	insurgency.	The	Green	clusters	represent	undecided,	or	swing,	or	unwitting	crowds,	and	the	battle	for	their	support	is	akin	to	the	battle	for	the	‘hearts	and	minds’	of	a	local	civilian	population	that	becomes	the	focus	in	insurgent	warfare.	Red	forms	into	a	large	number	of	clusters	(approx.	490)	with	sizes	ranging	from	less	than	100	to	several	hundreds	of	thousands.	Moreover,	they	are	connected	together	in	a	seemingly	decentralized	way,	akin	to	an	insurgency	[19].	In	addition,	Blue	is	numerically	larger	(nearly	7	million)	compared	to	Red	(approximately	4	million)	and	yet	there	are	many	more	clusters	of	Red.	Instead	Blue	is	organized	into	large	clusters	akin	to	a	conventional	army	(e.g.	Gates	Foundation	cluster	size	is	nearly	1.5	million).	Though	Blue	is	numerically	larger	than	Red,	it	can	be	seen	from	Fig.	1	that	Red	and	Green	are	overall	far	more	heavily	engaged	with	each	other	than	the	case	for	Blue	and	Green.	Again,	this	is	typical	of	insurgencies	where	insurgents	are	usually	more	successful	in	engaging	the	local	civilian	(i.e.	as-yet	non-combatant)	population	than	Blue.	It	is	also	telling	that	each	Red	cluster	has	on	average	more	links	to	other	Red	clusters	than	each	Blue	cluster	has	on	average	with	other	Blue	clusters,	suggesting	that	Red	looks	to	build	out	connections	to	other	Red	while	Blue	tends	to	have	more	stand-alone	clusters.	Moving	to	the	dynamics:	though	both	Red	and	Blue	clusters	change	size	between	June-October	2019,	some	Red	insurgent	clusters	grew	more	than	300%	since	early	summer	2019	with	one	exceeding	500%.	In	contrast,	the	maximum	growth	of	any	Blue	cluster	was	less	than	100%.	Such	a	rapid	rise	in	the	size	of	small	clusters	is	typical	of	an	insurgency	–	and	in	particular,	it	is	exactly	what	we	observed	previously	for	online	support	of	a	real	insurgency	in	Ref.	12.		
	
Figure	2.	Health	war	showing	clusters	from	the	network	in	Fig.	1	mapped	onto	their	declared	
geographical	location.	Inset	shows	the	cluster	network	drawn	without	regard	to	location,	and	instead	
with	an	arrangement	based	on	closeness	of	links	using	ForceAtlas2	algorithm	(see	also	Fig.	1).	These	
results,	while	again	preliminary	due	to	missing	data	about	other	Green	clusters	and	the	need	to	cross-
check	Red	and	Blue,	show	how	clusters	connect	this	online	war	across	countries	and	continents.	The	
“global	ether”	is	made	up	of	those	clusters	who	choose	not	to	localize	themselves	further	than	the	global	
scale	–	and	hence	which	presumably	see	themselves	as	a	global	cause	or	community.	
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Figure	3.	Preliminary	results	from	our	mathematically-grounded,	crowd-based	analysis	of	the	war’s	
evolution,	which	offers	an	explanation	for	how	Red	turns	the	tide	against	Blue.	A	full	version	of	the	
network	(i.e.	with	a	full	search	for	connected	Greens)	is	given	in	Fig.	4,	and	shows	similar	features.		
		Figure	3	shows	the	output	of	our	accompanying	model.	Leaving	mathematical	details	for	a	longer	paper,	we	note	here	that	the	model	comprises	an	ecology	of	clusters	(Red,	Blue	and	Green)	with	probabilities	of	interactions	in	time	given	by	the	relative	number	of	links	of	each	type	in	Fig.	1.	The	rules	of	engagement	are	that	Red	is,	when	interacting	with	Green,	effective	in	being	able	to	turn	Green	over	to	its	side,	while	Blue	is	not.	We	also	add	the	feature	that	Red	and	Blue	have	a	natural	loss	of	interest	over	time,	and	that	Red	and	Blue	can	interact	and	reduce	each	others’	numbers	to	mimic	people	getting	tired	of	the	fight	or	realizing	the	other	side’s	viewpoint.	Of	course,	these	rules	can	be	changed	and	nuanced,	and	need	to	be	explore	more	deeply	–	but	it	is	already	noteworthy	that,	as	shown	in	Fig.	3,	Red	starts	from	a	minority	position	but	is	able	to	eventually	show	an	upsurge	that	makes	them	dominant	over	Blue.			Figure	4	shows	a	fuller	version	of	the	network	from	Fig.	1,	obtained	by	carrying	out	a	full	search	for	connected	Greens.	It	shows	similar	features	to	Fig.	1,	but	serves	to	show	more	explicitly	how	Red	clusters	are	heavily	embedded	among	many	Green	clusters	while	Blue	clusters	are	not.	As	a	result	of	this	expanded	search	for	Greens,	there	are	now	approximately	100	million	individuals	in	Fig.	4.	
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Figure	4:	Fuller	version	of	Fig.	1’s	health	war	network,	obtained	using	a	more	complete	search	for	
connected	Greens.	It	shows	similar	features	to	Fig.	1,	but	serves	to	show	more	explicitly	how	Red	(anti-
vax)	clusters	are	heavily	embedded	among	Green	(neutral)	clusters	while	Blue	(pro-vax)	clusters	are	not.	
There	is	a	trivial	presentation	change	compared	to	Fig.	1:	it	is	rotated	and	flipped	with	the	side-arm	of	
Blue	now	appearing	on	the	right.	There	are	approximately	100	million	individuals	included	in	this	plot.	
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There	are	of	course	limitations	of	our	study.	We	have	only	presented	results	for	one	type	of	distrust	–	however	our	preliminary	findings	for	political	and	commercial	scenarios	are	somewhat	similar	(i.e.	fans	of	product	X	versus	fans	of	competing	product	Y).	Also,	we	have	not	touched	the	details	of	the	social	network	in	Figs.	1	or	2.	Instead	our	focus	here	is	on	the	broad-brush	system	level	behavior.	We	also	need	to	look	across	other	social	media	platforms,	but	it	is	likely	to	be	similar	on	any	platform	that	allows	communities	to	be	built	and	hence	where	deeper	debate	can	be	developed.	Also,	our	quantitative	analysis	is	highly	idealized	in	order	to	generate	quantitative	answers.	Although	not	intended	to	capture	the	complications	of	any	specific	real-	world	setting,	the	benefit	of	the	modelling	approach	in	Fig.	3	is	that	the	output	is	precisely	quantified,	reproducible	and	generalizable,	and	can	therefore	help	to	frame	policy	discussions	as	well	as	probe	what-if	intervention	scenarios.	One	may	also	wonder	about	the	role	of	external	agents	or	entities,	including	not	only	bots	but	State	actors.	In	terms	of	bots,	it	tends	to	be	that	clusters	police	themselves	for	any	postings	with	robotic	formats	to	weed	out	such	infiltrations.	In	terms	of	State	actors,	they	may	well	be	present	and	our	analysis	in	this	paper	neither	supports	nor	denies	their	presence.	Despite	these	and	other	potential	critiques,	we	believe	that	an	understanding	of	how	undecideds	become	drawn	into	the	distrust	ecologies	online,	may	also	help	with	other	currently	‘lost’	online	wars	where	the	core	narratives	and	intent	to	act	are	discussed	and	developed	in	online	clusters.	One	example	is	online	child	sexual	abuse	which	Refs.	13,14	describe	as	at	a	breaking	point,	with	reports	of	abusive	images	exceeding	the	capabilities	of	independent	clearinghouses	and	law	enforcement	to	take	action.	Another	potential	application	is	to	politics	and	the	upcoming	2020	elections	in	the	U.S.	 
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